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11 Introduction
When he concludes his treatise on biological evolution, the Origin of Species,
Charles Darwin suggests the possibility to use his theory “for far more im-
portant researches”, namely to explain the evolution of human faculties and
societies. Thus, and Darwin remains vague, one reads that “In the distant
future ... Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” ([?]).
He thus had the project to write a treatise on the origins of a very peculier
specie, man, and the evolution of human traits and faculties. In eﬀect, Dar-
win was rapidly - “in the year 1837 or 1838” (Autobiography, p. 131) while
he is writing the Origin of Species - ”convinced that species were mutable
productions” (ibid.) and then he ”could not avoid the belief that man must
come under the same law” (ibid.). However, such views were obviously chal-
lenging to what people of his time believed. Therefore, Darwin decided to
behave cautiously in the exposition of his theories, considering “useless and
injurious to the success of the book to have paraded without giving any
evidence my conviction with respect to his origin” (ibid., p. 132). And it is
only when Darwin “found that many naturalists fully accepted the doctrine
of the evolution of species”, then ”it seemed to [him] advisable to work up
such notes as [he] possessed and to publish a special treatise on the origin of
man” (Autobiography, p. 130). The treatise Darwin eventually publishes in
1871 is entitled the Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex and its
purpose is to show “that man must be included with other organic beings in
any general conclusion respecting his manner of appearance on this earth”
(Darwin, [7]). In other words, the book is indeed written with the important
objective to complement the theses of the Origin of Species.
But, although the Descent of Man obviously occupies a non negligible
place in Darwin’s theoretical framework, the book has not been frequently
refered to (quoted, cited or even mentioned) by economists. The latter only
view Darwin as the author of one major book, a biologist whose concepts
were used by others to develop theories of social evolution rather than as a
biologist who indeed attempted to develop his own theory of social evolution.
As a consequence, the focus has always essentially been put upon the Origin
of Species, the Descent of Man being left aside (Marciano, [46]). The debates
about Darwin and how his insights could help the establishment of a theory
of social evolution were, and still are, methodological, epistemological or
ethical: the questions that are thus asked relate to the possible transfer of
concepts and mechanisms from biology to social sciences, from nature to
human societies.
2One of the most important - even if controversial - scholars with regard to
social and cultural evolution, Friedrich Hayek signiﬁcantly adopts the same
attitude towards Darwin. Nothing indeed suggests that Hayek refers to the
social evolutionist who wrote the Descent of Man. To the contrary, Hayek al-
most undoubtedly considers Darwin as a biologist only. He therefore equates
Darwinism with biology, and a Darwinian theory with a biological theory
of evolution as when he speaks of “the Darwinian or biological theory of
evolution” (Hayek, [30], p. 24). Now, in Hayek’s views, Darwinian explana-
tions of social phenomena are not only biological but are also similar to the
theories developed by Bagehot and Spencer and, therefore, belong to social
Darwinism (see for instance, [22], pp. 243-244). Hayek was then cautious
to distinguish his approach to social evolution from Darwinism and from
social Darwinism. He thus insisted that “The Mechanism of Cultural Evo-
lution is Not Darwinian” ([30] p. 23; emphasis added) because he viewed his
theory as having features closer to Lamarck’s theory than to Darwin’s: “to
refer to terms now used in biological discussion, cultural evolution simulates
Lamarckism” (ibid. p. 25; emphasis in original).
Whether Hayek’s theory of social evolution is indeed Lamarckian (Birner,
[2]; Witt, [61], [60]) or Darwinian (Khalil, [41]) or both (Hodgson, [36])
has been debated. Beyond the answer itself, what is important to note is
that commentators have always tried to compare Hayek’s theory of cultural
evolution with a biological (Lamarck’s or Darwin’s) theory of evolution. No
comparison has ever been made with Darwin’s theory of social evolution.
This is the purpose of this paper: to compare Hayek’s theory of cultural
evolution to the theory of social evolution exposed by Darwin in his Descent
of Man and to show that, in that case, it is possible to conclude that Hayek’s
theory of social evolution is Darwinian.
Our demonstration develops in two stages. First, we argue that the two
theories rest on the same ontological or philosophical basis, that of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment (section 1) and, second, that they are based on the same
principles: a similar target and mechanism of selection (section 2).
2 The Scottish Enlightenment as a common background
The writings of the classical political economists undoubtedly form the
“background” (Caldwell, [5]; see also Dupuy, [14]) that gives Hayek’s theory
of cultural evolution is meaning. Thus, Hayek has always insisted that one
should not forget that Darwin inherited the important concepts, upon which
3rests his theory of biological evolution, from classical political economists:
“The idea of biological evolution stems from the study of processes of cultural
development” ([30], p. 24)1. Hume, Smith, Ferguson and Stewart were, in
Hayek’s views, “Darwinians before Darwin” and, more speciﬁcally, “Hume
may be called a precursor to Darwin in the ﬁeld of ethics” (Hayek, [24], p.
107). Now, the reasoning Darwin leads in the Descent of Man has its roots
in the same tradition. In eﬀect, in the Descent of Man, the references to
the classical political economists are much more frequent than in the Origin
of Species. Darwin then interestingly refers to Hume’s Treatise on Human
Nature and Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Thus, both Darwin and
Hayek utilise the same theory of human nature when they reﬂect on the
evolution of human societies.
2.1 Reason, between abstraction and imitation
Hayek and Darwin acknowledge the fact that human beings are granted with
a speciﬁc capacity that can be qualiﬁed as “reason”. Hayek claims that he
is a “rationalist” and, on his side, Darwin states that “of all the faculties of
the human mind, it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason stands at the
summit” ([8], p. 292). However, both Hayek and Darwin retain a deﬁnition
of reason that makes their rationalism very speciﬁc, compared to what could
be considered as a standard, rational version of rationalism. On one side,
Hayek’s social philosophy, and also his theory of cultural evolution, rests on
the distinction he makes between “individualism true” and “individualism
false” (Caldwell, [5], p. 7). He criticises the ”false” version of “construc-
tivist” rationalism that he associates with Descartes and Cartesianism and
upon which stand the theories of the si` ecle des Lumi` eres (see Boettke, [3];
Horwitz, [37]). By contrast, he accepts and locates his theory within the
limits of the “true” version of rationalism that corresponds to the sponta-
neous order tradition that culminates in the writings of classical political
economists. On his side, Darwin does not explicitly but implicitly oppose
to the cartesian tradition of rationalism. In eﬀect, even if the French ra-
tionalist philosopher is not quoted nor mentioned in his writings, Darwin
nonetheless indicates that he belongs to the opposed tradition, that of the
Scottish Enlightenment of Smith and Hume.
These philosophers, and of course this is the very reason why Hayek and
Darwin refer to them, develop a theory of human nature that clearly diﬀers
from cartesian rationalism. They propose a sensualist theory of human na-
1See the analyses by Gordon, [16], Depew and Weber [10], and Schweber [51], [52].
4ture, in which senses replace reason in the perception of the world and the
building of human knowledge (Marciano, [44], [45]). From their perspective,
human reason is only a limited capacity that does not allows individuals to
question and correct what they perceive from the external world. To the
contrary, in Hume’s view for instance, human reason is a bounded capac-
ity that “only” combines the impressions – the “data” or “information” –
that individuals perceive through their senses and receive from the external
world. In fact, the mind does not receive indistinctively impressions from
the environment. Hume thus explains the that individuals do not memorise
independent and isolated impressions. Rather, the mind stores sequences of
impressions (or cognitive sequences) that will then make the perception of
new impressions possible. To some extent, one may say that Hume develops
a theory in which “pattern recognition” plays a decisive role. Thus, percep-
tion is past- or path-dependent: the capacity to perceive objects increases
with the number of perceptions. Furthermore, past perceptions screen and
ﬁlter future ones.
This theory of human nature is similar to Hayek’s philosophy of mind and
his related theory of perception. Our mind is supposedly made up of ab-
stract categories that serve to interpret and select and then classify incoming
information. Therefore, abstract categories precede and make possible, tem-
porarily and logically, conscious thinking and our aptitude to explicitly form
more complicated abstractions (Hayek, 1980, p. 34); one should not con-
fuse the abstract schemata that result from experience and allow perception
with abstract scientiﬁc theories. As a consequence, the abstract schemata
that compose the human mind depend on the experience previously accu-
mulated: “every sensation, even the ’purest’, must therefore be regarded as
an interpretation of an event in the light of the past experience of the indi-
vidual or the species” ([21], p. 16; see also[31], pp. 35-49; [30]). Therefore,
the diﬀerences that indeed exist between the cognitive capacities of grown
up adult, children or animals are only a matter of quantity of accumulated
experience. No qualitative diﬀerences distinguish animals and children and
adults. They all possess the capacity to perceive the external world through
abstract categories
“The baby and the animal certainly do not live in the same
sensory world in which we live. But this is so, not because,
though their ‘sense data’ are the same, they have not yet been
able to derive from them as many abstractions as we have done,
but because of the much thinner net of ordering relations which
they possess — because the much smaller number of abstract
5classes under which their subsume their impressions makes the
qualities which their supposedly elementary sensations possess
much less rich” ([31], p. 44).
On his side, Darwin he claims that, as soon as human beings as well as
animals are able to classify what their perceive through their senses – the
impressions they receive from the external world – into existing categories,
then they are able to conceive general ideas. In this regard, there are no
diﬀerences between man and animals. They both perceive their environment
through abstract categories – “general concepts” – that help them to identify
or recognise “patterns”. He thus notes that “the greatest stress seems to be
laid on the supposed entire absence in animals of the power of abstraction,
or of forming general concepts” ([8], p. 296). However, “when a dog sees
another dog at distance, it is often clear that he perceives that it is a dog
in the abstract; for when he gets nearer his whole manner suddenly changes
if the other dog be a friend” (ibid.). He thus departs from rationalism –
in which the existence of rational reason marks the diﬀerence between man
and animals – and accepts the idea that “there is no fundamental diﬀerence
between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties” (ibid.)2.
Furthermore, as a previous quotation shows it, Darwin tellingly illustrates
his description of how human reason functions by examples of the behaviours
of animals ([8], pp. 292-294). Then, if there are diﬀerences and indeed there
are, between man and higher mammals, they depend on the on the amount
of accumulated experience. He thus notes that
2What can be called “evolutionist continuity”, between man and animals is a contro-
versial issue. Yet, Darwin viewed this continuity as a key element, that could guarantee
the consistency of the theories presented in the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man.
Thus, in his autobiography, he writes “As soon as I had become, in the year 1837 or 1838,
convinced that species were mutable productions, I could not avoid the belief that man
must come under the same law. Accordingly I collected notes on the subject for my own
satisfaction, and not for a long time with an intention of publishing” (Autobiography, p.
131). Man was then “a leitmotiv” (Herbert, [33], p. 197) and also “an issue of its own
merit” (ibid.; emphasis added) for Darwin since 1837, thirty-four years prior to the pub-
lication of the Descent of Man, when he ﬁlled his transmutation notebooks (from 1837 to
1841). Why is it so? The importance of a theory of human behaviour for Darwin “simply”
rests in the possible generalisation of his theory of biological evolution. Indeed, this early
conviction indicates both his optimism and satisfaction “about the general prospects ...
and ... the explanatory powers of his theory” (Herbert, [33], pp. 201-2). The conﬁdence
thus gained led him to raison “questions concerning the evolution of instincts, emotions,
language and intelligence”, and to ask “how one can explain sociability and the evolution
of human societies and their institutions” (Schweber, [51], p. 232).
6“no doubt, as Mr. Wallace has argued, much of the intelligent
work done by man is due to imitation and not to reason; but
there is this great diﬀerence between his actions and many of
those performed by the lower animals, namely, that man cannot
on his ﬁrst trial, make, for instance, a stone hatchet or a canoe,
through his power of imitation. He has to learn his work by
practice” ([8], pp. 288-289; emphasis added).
In other words, Darwin claims, the repetition of purposeful actions allow
human beings, and higher mammals as well, to acquire a certain experience
of the relationships that exist between events. Then, practice and experience
give birth abstract classes that in turn breed more experience and increase
the individuals capacity to reason. Therefore, to claim, as Darwin does, that
reason stands at the “summit” of human faculties does not mean that this
faculty stands “above” other human faculties.
In this view, Hayek and Darwin seemingly share a similar conception on
reason: this capacity is not the cause of knowledge and perception of the
outside world; to the contrary, it results from the fact that human beings
(and animals) receive perceptions from their environment. Human beings do
no construct a priori, speculative and independent abstract categories about
the world. To the contrary, these categories result from being part of the
world. To put it in other words, cognitive processes and the acquisition of
knowledge result from participation in the world, rather than in speculation
about the world as it is in Descartes’ perspective (see Livingston, [43] on
the diﬀerence between ‘participative’ and ‘speculative’ knowledge). Reason
thus results from being part of the world; Reason results from the experience
that human beings draw from their environment, and therefore from the use
and exercise of other capacities and faculties3.
Then, another question arises. Each individual subjectively perceives his or
her environment. Therefore, the abstract classes that result from individual
experience are also personal. Reason depends on the private, personal and
subjective, experience accumulated. How do these dispersed and subjective
experience lead to harmonised knowledge?
3Signiﬁcantly, Darwin describes reason after having described the other mental facul-
ties, namely “attention” (p. 291), “memory” (p. 291), “imitation” (pp. 291-292) and
“imagination” (p. 292). The order reveals that reason does not replace but complete
other human faculties. Reason can only exist after other faculties have developed.
72.2 Social and moral instincts and human nature
The perspective adopted by the founders of classical political economy, that
is the assumption of a non-constructivist rationalism, necessarily implies
that civil societies were not created by a social contract. Individuals are
not able to envisage and build institutions that they have not experienced.
And institutions actually exist because they have always existed. In eﬀect,
in contrast to what individualist theorists – in particular social contract
theorists like Hobbes – have argued, human beings never lived in have never
lived isolated and separated from others; they did not rationally choose to
live with others in social groups. Human beings have always lived in social
states. If a state of nature ever existed, it never resembled to what Hobbes
describes. To the contrary, the “very ﬁrst state and situation” of man is a
“social state” in which “Cordial aﬀection, compassion, sympathy, were the
only movements, with which the human mind was yet acquainted” (Hume,
[40], p. 494). Sociability is not acquired but innate or rather, as both
Hayek and Darwin claim, instinctive. On his side, Hayek argues that the
model Hobbes proposed to explain the origins of societies that considers
individualism and isolation as the primary form of life is “mythical” – “the
primitive individualism described by Thomas Hobbes is ... a myth” ([30],
p. 20). Similarly, Darwin insists that the ﬁrst stages of human or animal life
were social: “Every one will admit that man is a social being” ([8], p. 76).
In both cases, the explanation given to justify the elementary fact of social
life refers to instincts. Hayek: “The savage is not solitary, and his instinct
is collectivist” ([30], p. 20).
Instincts thus form the “cement” of primary and elementary social groups,
ﬁrst of all because of their biological nature. They exist before any other
faculty and, accordingly, make the development of mental faculties possible.
To some extent, this means that original instincts develop and grow, turning
into something more complex. This also means that they never disappear.
This is indeed a typical feature of the evolutionary perspectives that Hayek
and Darwin adopt – and this is consistent with the evolutionary continuity
that exists between man and animals. Human beings never loose their nat-
ural, and thus biological, origins. In fact, evolution does not imply or mean
that instincts will eventually disappear, but their role changes and the num-
ber of behaviours driven by instincts progressively decrease with evolution;
while the role of reason and experience complementarily increase. However,
Darwin is clear about the fact that the presence (or lack) of instincts cannot
be used as a criterion to mark a diﬀerence between man, higher animals
and lower animals. On his side, Hayek also emphasises that, even in open
8societies, there remains a part of each individual that react as a primary
man, as a savage who takes into consideration only what happens in small
groups ([27], p. 181).
Interestingly, the last quotation reveals that instincts play a social role –
sociability rests on instincts – but they also play an important role in in-
teractions with others because of their moral dimension. In other words,
instincts do not only allow human beings to coordinate their activities, they
also aﬀect the way they behave. From this perspective, it seems that both
Darwin and Hayek envisage human interactions as having a twofold dimen-
sion, based on instincts and morality. In other words, individual behaviours
and interactions are not only immediately and directly instinctive and also
have a moral dimension. The two aspects cannot be separated and even,
instincts and morality reinforce each other. First, sociability gives birth to
morality: “any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts
[...] would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience” (Darwin, [8],
p. 304; emphasis added). Reciprocally, morality breeds sociability. More
precisely, the very existence of morality makes social interaction possible
and allows the development of higher faculties, like reason and intelligence.
Hayek:
“Man is not born wise, rational and good, but has to be taught to
become so. It is not our intellect that created our morals; rather,
human interactions governed by our morals make possible the
growth of reason and those capabilities associated with it” ([30],
p. 21)
Darwin provides a speciﬁc explanation to the link that exists between
morality and sociality. He thus argues that the moral sense that charac-
terises human beings takes the form of sympathy, a concept that he explic-
itly links to Smith and “the excellent ﬁrst chapter of [his] Theory of Moral
Sentiments”4. Thus, sympathy “forms an essential part of the social in-
stinct, and is indeed its foundation-stone” ([8], p. 304). However, evolution
4Darwin’s views on the role and importance of sympathy have changed. In his note-
books, Darwin notes “sympathy is very unsatisfactory because it does not like Burke
explain pleasure” (s´ erie M, p. 108, Aoˆ ut 1838). Then, in the Descent of Man, he stresses:
“Adam Smith has formerly argued [...] that the basis of sympathy lies in our strong
relentiveness of former states of pain and pleasure. Hence, the sight of another person
enduring hunger, cold, fatigue, revives in us some recollection of these states, which are
painful even in idea. We are thus impelled to relieve the suﬀerings of another, in order
that our own painful feeling may be at the same time relieved. In like manner we are led
to participate in the pleasures of others” ([8], p. 308).
9transforms - even if it does not suppress them - moral sentiments and in-
stincts, and modiﬁes their role by comparison to the role played in primitive
societies. Therefore, the functioning of what Hayek names “large societies”
and Darwin “civilised societies” is diﬀerent than that of primitive groups.
In large or civilised societies, instincts may play a role in the interactions of
friends and acquaintances; however, it plays no role in the interactions with
strangers. Then, self-interest, and therefore reason, complements the role of
instincts, moral sentiments and sympathy.
Yet, even if Darwin and Hayek seem to consider the important moral role
of instincts (or the role of moral sentiments), they nonetheless do not the
same words to describe the nature of moral relationships between human be-
ings. While Darwin utilises the concept of sympathy, a concept that Hayek,
quite surprisingly with regard to his debt towards the founders of political
economy, never employs. Rather, he describes morals relationships in terms
of “altruism”. Is it only a matter of semantics? Or are there conceptual
diﬀerences between sympathy and Hayek’s altruism? The question is all
the more important that sympathy diﬀers from altruism and egoism. Hume
and Smith do not equate sympathy with altruism et do not consider that
sympathy excludes egoism5. Or, in other words, egoist behaviours remain
possible even in a world in which sympathy supposedly characterises human
nature. In fact, sympathy and egoism are complementary: when sympathy
ceases to operate, egoism (or altruism) can take place6. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that sympathy only takes place among family members,
close friends or acquaintances (see for instance Hume, [40], p. 534). This is
one of the features that Darwin accepts and includes in his analysis: “sym-
pathy is directed solely towards the members of the same community, and
therefore towards known, and more or less beloved members, but not to all
the individuals of the same species” ([8], p. 309). This is also a feature that,
in Hayek’s view, characterises altruism. In eﬀect, the moral sentiments that
individuals possess are the consequence, the evolved form of the feelings that
individuals naturally adopted towards the other members of the group (see
5Adam Smith begins the Theory of Moral Sentimens by stating that an individual
may feel sympathy and, at the same time, be selﬁsh: “How selﬁsh, soever, man may be
supposed there are evidently some principles in nature which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it” (1976, p. 9).
6“Sympathy, however, cannot ; in any sense, be regarded as a selﬁsh principle [...]
That whole account of human nature, however, which deduces all sentiments and aﬀections
from self-love, which has made so much noise in the world, but which so far as I know, has
never yet been fully distinctly explained, seems to me to have arisen from some confused
misapprehension of the system of sympathy” (Smith, 1976, p. 317).
10for instance, (1982, p. 106). Hayek even speaks of “moral socialism” (ibid.).
Thus, altruism and sympathy share, beyond their diﬀerences, the features
to be both instinctive and to operate in small groups. This aspect plays a
decisive role from the perspective of a theory of social evolution. Let us now
turn to the analysis of Hayek’s and Darwin’s respective theories of cultural
evolution.
3 The mechanisms of selection
In the theories that he develops in the Origin of Species and in the Descent
of Man, Darwin utilises a principle of selection to explain evolution. But,
and this is the reason why it is possible to speak about a theory of cultural
evolution, the mechanism of selection does not function in the same ways in
the two areas, nature and culture. Darwin adapts the mechanism of selection
to the domain in which his theory applies. In a similar perspective, Hayek
seeks to demonstrate that a biological theory of evolution can possibly be
used as a model to understand the evolution of institutions. Certainly, there
are diﬀerences between biological evolution and social or cultural evolution.
However, there remains that in both cases, evolution can be described as
“a process of continuous adaptation to unforseable events, to contingent cir-
cumstances which could not have been forecast” (Hayek, [30], p. 25). Social
order, just like biological order, then follows the same evolutionary logic:
there is no global purpose that guides evolution. This is common element
can be used as a starting point to explain the use by Darwin and Hayek of
the same mechanism of selection to explain social evolution (3.1). However,
culture diﬀers from nature. To take into account these diﬀerences, the two
scholars propose a theory in which the group is the target of the process of
selection (3.2). The process of cultural selection that then takes places at
the group level mostly consist in a transmission of acquired characters (3.3)
that involve individuals but rest on imitation (3.4).
3.1 The principle of selection
In the works he devotes to cultural evolution, Hayek frequently includes
references to biology. The reason is straightforward: although there are
diﬀerences that have to be stressed, and that will be discussed later, be-
tween nature and culture and the process of evolution in the two spheres,
there also exist similarities to emphasize. More than analogies that would
allow superﬁcial comparisons, Hayek claims that social evolution “follows
11in many respects the same pattern as biological evolution” (Hayek, [31],
p. 292), that cultural evolution “looks very much like biological evolution”
(Hayek, ibid.) because “it also rests on a sort of natural selection” (ibid.). In
other words, biological and cultural evolution “both rely on the same prin-
ciple of selection: survival or reproductive advantage. Variation, adaptation
and competition are essentially the same kind of process, however diﬀerent
their particular mechanisms, particularly those pertaining to propagation”
(Hayek, [30], p. 26).
Similarly, Darwin’s analysis of social evolution also assumes an evolution-
ary continuity that exists between nature and culture. Even if Smith’s The-
ory of Moral Sentiments and Hume’s Enquiry on the Principles of Morals
are referred to in the course of the exposition of his theory of social evolu-
tion, “Malthus’s” struggle for life and even Spencer’s survival of the ﬁttest
are nonetheless not absent from the theory that Darwin develops. This
is not surprising. In eﬀect, one should not forget that Darwin wants to
apply the concepts he used in his theory of biological evolution to model
social evolution. In other words, his purpose is to describe the evolution of
moral, mental and intellectual human faculties in terms of natural selecti-
ton. Darwin thus frequently reminds his reader that one cannot explain the
evolution of man and social faculties without a reference to natural selection
and struggle for life: “I have now endeavoured to shew that some of the most
distinctive characters of man have in all probability been acquired, either di-
rectly, or more commonly indirectly, through natural selection” ([8], p. 47);
or “The early progenitors of man must ... occasionally have been exposed
to a struggle for existence, and consequently to the rigid law of natural se-
lection” (ibid., p. 39); and “Such social qualities [as sympathy, ﬁdelity, and
courage], ... were no doubt acquired by the progenitors of man in a similar
manner, namely, through natural selection” (ibid., p. 321). Therefore, Dar-
win claims, natural selection guides biological as well as cultural evolution.
By contrast with other naturalists of his time, who nonetheless defended the
explanation of the dynamic evolution of social order based on a principle of
selection, Darwin is one of the rare to demonstrate that natural selection
does not stop to operate at the frontier of the cultural sphere.
Yet, culture is not the extension of nature. Continuity, or the lack of
rupture between culture and nature, does not mean that these are exactly
the same mechanisms that apply in the two spheres. Both Darwin and Hayek
adopt perspective in which natural selection does not suﬃce to explain the
entire and complex phenomenon of social evolution.
123.2 Social evolution and group selection
The ﬁrst very important diﬀerence that exists between cultural and bio-
logical evolution concerns the target of selection. Thus, although the same
principle (“natural selection”) applies in culture and in nature, competi-
tion or “struggle-for-life” do not take place between the same entities in
nature and in culture. In this view, the most noticeable feature of Hayek’s
and Darwin’s theories is that cultural evolution is modelled as a process of
group selection, rather than a process of individual selection. Therefore,
the individual is not longer viewed as the target of selection or, still in other
words, individuals no longer bear the reproductive advantage as in biological
selection.
On his side, it is now admittesd that Hayek - and this aspect of his theory
has been the subject of many discussions - indeed proposes a theory of social
evolution in which groups play a decisive and crucial role. In fact, as shown
in particular by Caldwell ([5]), Hayek “explicitly added the mechanism of
group selection to his description of cultural evolution” in the late 1960s7,
then it became an increasingly prominent theme in Hayek’s writings about
social evolution ([5]; see also Angner, [1]; Steele ([54]) and it lasted until
The Fatal Conceit in the 1980s. There are not many direct and explicit
references to “group selection” in Hayek’s writings. Hayek ﬁrst mentioned
the necessity to refer to groups in an explanation of social evolution - this is
his “ﬁrst articulation of the notion of group selection” ([5], p. 15) - in 1967,
when he notes that
“For the understanding of animal and human societies the dis-
tinction is particularly important because the genetic (and in
great measure also the cultural) transmission of rules of con-
duct takes place from individual to individual, while what may
be called the natural selection of rules will operate on the basis
of the greater or lesser eﬃciency of the resulting order of the
group” (Hayek, [25], p. 67; emphasis in original).
Then, he explicitly mentioned “group selection” in a footnote: “Although
the conception of group selection may now not appear as important as it
had been thought after its introduction [...] there can be no doubt that it is
of the great importance for cultural evolution (Hayek, [28], p. 202, note 37),
the ﬁrst occurrence of “group selection” (Caldwell, [5], p. 16). And, while
aware of the limits of group selection explanations in biology, Hayek insists
7Precisely when group selection was attacked by Hamilton([18],[19] and Williams [58].
13that this is one of the major diﬀerences that exist between cultural selection
and biological selection: “whether group selection also operates in biological
evolution remains an open question – one on which my argument does not
depend” ([30], p. 25). Then, he eventually wrote that “cultural evolution is
founded wholly on group selection” (Hayek, [29], p. 318) or that “cultural
evolution operates largely through group selection” ([30], p. 25).
About one hundred years before Hayek wrote these words, another biolo-
gist, namely Darwin, also built a theory of social evolution in which selection
operates at the group level. Thus, it can be argued, as Borello for insance
does, that, “some form of group selection was indeed a part of his original
theory” ([4], p. 43); in that case, group selection was already used in the
Origins of Species and more speciﬁcally in the part devoted to social insects.
At least, it can be claimed that Darwin remained “resolutely opposed group
selection in the non-human world” (Ruse, [49], p. 626) but “when it came to
our own species, Darwin ... “became a group selectionist” (ibid.). In eﬀect,
Darwin’s group selectionism is explicitly at the core of his analysis of how
human faculties evolve, that is in the Descent of Man. Thus,
“with strictly social animals, natural selection sometimes acts
on the individual, through the preservation of variations which
are beneﬁcial to the community [...] With the higher social
animals, I am not aware that any structure has been modiﬁed
solely for the good of the community [...] In regard to certain
mental powers the case [...] is wholly diﬀerent; for these facul-
ties have been chieﬂy, or even exclusively, gained for the beneﬁt
of the community, and the individuals thereof have at the same
time gained an advantage indirectly” ([8], p. 285-286; emphasis
added).
Or
“A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a
high degree the spirit of patriotism, ﬁdelity, odedience, courage,
and sympathy, were always ready to aid another, and to sacriﬁce
themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most
other tribes” ([8], p. 322).
Therefore, quite interestingly, Darwin does not only focus on the group as
the target of selection; he also draws the most immediate and important
consequence of this assumption: social selection is made possible because
individuals are ready to sacriﬁce themselves for the beneﬁt of the group.
143.3 The transmission of acquired characteristics
A second important, and paradoxical, feature of the theories of social evo-
lution that were proposed by Darwin and Hayek has to be investigated,
namely the conservation or transmission of acquired characteristics. Usu-
ally, the possible transmission of acquired characteristics, that obviously
happens in human societies, is assumed to be typical of Lamarck’s theory
rather than that of Darwin. Then, it cannot be Darwinian and should not
be found in a Darwinian theory of evolution. Yet, both scholars envisage
social and cultural evolution as a process in which the traits and practices
that have been acquired can be transmitted to the other members of the
group and then to other groups.
Hayek thus explains that “although biological theory now excludes the in-
heritance of acquired characteristics, all cultural development rests on such
inheritance – characteristics in the form of rules guiding the mutual rela-
tions among individuals which are not innate but learnt” ([30], p. 25). That
could be problematic to claim that Hayek’s theory is Darwinian from the
perspective of a comparison with Darwin’s theory of biological evolution.
However, the problem disappears if one refers to Darwin’s Descent of Man.
In eﬀect, Darwin claims that intellectual and moral faculties are partly the
product of the eﬀects of natural selection and of learning, habit and there-
fore are partly inherited. Thus, he notes that “the intellectual and moral
faculties of man ... are variable; and we have every reason to believe that the
variations tend to be inherited” ([8], p. 89). Or, “The greater intellectual
vigour and power of invention in man is probably due to natural selection,
combined with the inherited eﬀects of habit” ([8], p. 372); or “It is not
improbable that after long practice virtuous tendencies may be inherited”
(ibid., p. 376). These are but two references to “inheritance”. The Descent
of Man seems to be entirely built on a two forces, natural selection and the
transmission of acquired characteristics.
3.4 Cultural selection, groups and individuals
Theories of cultural selection in which the target is the group and acquired
characters are transmitted have been criticised, in economics as well as in
biology, for being unable to face problems of incentives and free riding:
why would individual accept to sacriﬁce themselves for the group? How to
explain that indviduals innovate if their innovation beneﬁts in the ﬁrst place
to others? And then how and why these innovations spread (are transmitted)
from one individual to others and then from one group to others. Many are
15those who have stressed how contradictory group selectionism could be from
the perspective of supposedly individualist approaches such as Hayek’s and
Darwin’s (see in particular Gray, [17], pp. 52-53; Vanberg, [55], [56]; Steele,
[54]; Hodgson, [34], [35]; Witt, [59]). In these views, the way practices and
traits are invented and transmitted from one individual to others and then
from one group to others is hardly understandable. Two types of answers
can be put forward to answer these criticisms.
First, group selection does not evacuate individuals from social evolution.
In eﬀect, group selection is “not incompatible with methodological individ-
ualism, once it is recognized that methodological individualism does not
depend upon individual organisms being the (sole) unit of selection” (Whit-
man, [57], p. 62). Social evolution, as described by Hayek and Darwin, thus
involves two completary levels, the lower individual and the higher group
level. More precisely, this is of great importance, a hierarchical relationship
links these two levels of selection, individuals and the groups to which they
belong, the former being the necessary condition for the latter to develop.
As, for instance, Gick and Gick ([15]) have stressed in Hayek’s theory of so-
cial evolution, the role of individuals is necessary to innovate: it is not only
that individual selection “is a process that operates on a subjectivist plane”
(Gick and Gick, [15], p. 157) but also that each invidual’s perceptions “are
sligthly diﬀerent from altrady existing ones and hence lead to the creation
of new rules” (ibid., p. 156, emphasis in original). On his side, Darwin, who
does not enter into the details of the origins of innovation, nonetheless locate
innovations at the individual level. But, innovation is not a consequence of
incentives: it results from the diﬀerences that exist between subjective per-
ceptions and subjective classiﬁcation of external stimuli. This thus makes
sense if viewed from the perspective of Hayek’s, and Darwin’s, theory of
cognition described in the preceding section.
Second, one must not forget that the theories of social evolution we are
discussing are rooted in the Scottish Enlightement tradition8, in which in-
dividuals are not capable, because of the weakness of their reason, evaluate
or calculate the beneﬁts of their actions. Therefore, they cannot rationally,
deliberately and explicitly decide or choose to adopt a practice or even a
“trait” (a moral quality) that is adopted by other individuals - such a cal-
8As Steele claims, “Thus Hayek’s repeated insistence on the importance of cultural
group selection is part of his general case against what he regards as excessive reliance
on reason” ([54], p. 173). But, this is for this reason that Hayek’s theory of group
selection assumes the legacy of classical political economy, precisely because he does not
view individuals as rational beings
16culus would require capacities that human beings do not have. Rather, and
both Hayek and Darwin insist on this, the transmission of traits and prac-
tices among the membres of a given group rest on learning. More speciﬁcally,
learning through the imitation of the other members of the group is decisive
in a process of cultural selection. The capacity to imitate others, as Hayek
notes, the “ability to acquire skills by imitative learning” ([30], p. 21)”, is
“perhaps the most important capacity with which the human individuals is
genetically endowed, beyond innate response” (ibid.)9. On his side, Darwin
claimed that “The principle of IMITATION is strong in man” ([8], p. 54),
listed the “tendency to imitation” as one “of the faculties, which have been
of inestimable service to man for his progressive advancement” ([8], p. 67)
and accepted Wallace’s statement that “much of the intelligent work done
by man is due to imitation and not to reason” (ibid., p. 51). More impor-
tantly is the fact that Darwin explicitly links imitation with the adoption
of innovation within a group: “if some one man in a tribe ... invented a
new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the plainest self-
interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power, would prompt the
other members to imitate him” (ibid., p. 90).
Therefore, once an individual has innovated, his or her innovation may (or
may not, if it is not adopted by the group) spread within the group, among
the members of the group. Therefore, and this is the reason why one may
speak of group selection, both in Hayek’s and Darwin’s views, a successful
innovation has to be adopted within a group (this is a necessary condition)
before being transmitted to (i.e. adopted by) other groups.
This raises a ﬁnal question that a theory of group selection has to deal
with, namely the transmission of a trait or practice, that were selected and
adopted within a given group, to other groups. In other words, the ques-
tion is: how do the practices adopted within a group tend to displace those
used in other groups? How do successful groups succeed and impose their
practices to others? With regard to this question and Hayek’s answers, com-
mentators have noted how imprecise they were: “Hayek should be criticised
... for failing to incorporate additional processes of selection above the group
level” (Hodgson, [35], p. 177; see also,a nd among others, Zywicki, [62], p.
87; or Steele, [54], pp. 173 sq). Curiously, Darwin was not more precise
in the Descent of Man, even if he seemingly attributed the same role to
9It is interesting to note that the ﬁrst time Hayek describes imitation ([25], p. 47),
he explicitly refers to the chapter entitled “sympathetic imitation” written by Dugald
Stewart. And one reminds that Darwin get acquainted with Smith and sympathy when
reading Stewart.
17imitation between groups as within groups. I thus appears that for Hayek
and for Darwin as well, what seems to be important is the result of the
process of social selection, namely that successful groups “would increase
their populations relative to other groups”; successful groups are wealth-
ier, more populous than others (Hayek 1988:120–22) Zywicki ([62], p. 87).
Thus, population growth was the key to success in inter-group competition.
The explanation Hayek gives parallels the one proposed by Darwin; the lat-
ter links the increase in population of one group with the transmission of
innovative practices or traits:
“We can see, that in the rudest state of society, the individ-
uals who were the most sagacious, who invented and used the
best weapons or traps, and who were best able to defend them-
selves, would rear the greatest number of oﬀspring. The tribes,
which included the largest number of men thus endowed, would
increase in number and supplant other tribes. Numbers depend
primarily on the means of subsistence, and this depends partly on
the physical nature of the country, but in a much higher degree
on the arts which are there practised. As a tribe increases and
is victorious, it is often still further increased by the absorption
of other tribes” [8], p. 89
or, “If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in
number, spread, and supplant other tribes” (ibid., p. 88); and “Nevertheless
the more intelligent members within the same community will succeed better
in the long run than the inferior, and leave a more numerous progeny” (ibid.,
p. 90).
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to show that Hayek’s theory of cultural evo-
lution can indeed be considered as Darwinian. To reach this conclusion, in
contrast to the usual perspectives on Hayek and Darwin, we have compared
Hayek’s and Darwin’s theories of social evolution. It then appears that both
theories belong to the same philosophical or ontological tradition, that of the
Scottish Enlightenment. Furthermore, they both take into consideration the
speciﬁcities of cultural evolution with regard to biological evolution: both
Hayek and Darwin consider that selection takes place at the group level
and both of them argue that acquired characteristics are transmitted. The
18latter element is interesting; it helps to clarify the diﬀerences that exist be-
tween Hayek and Darwin, on one side, and Lamarck, on the other side. The
major diﬀerence being that Hayek and Darwin envisage the transmission
of acquired characteristics from the perspective of spontaneous order where
Lamarck views this feature as taking place in a teleological process.
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